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O'Brien v. O'Brien: A Failed Reform,
Unlikely Reformers
Ira Mark Ellman*
O'Brien v. O'Brien1 was a radical decision, with the poten-
tial for enormous impact in many people's lives. Yet it was ren-
dered by the high court of a state that had been among the most
conservative in the nation within the domain of marital prop-
erty law. Its holding had been urged as a necessary break-
through to make the law of divorce fair and protect the financial
security of married women generally. Yet the mounting number
of cases from other states rejecting its position were a great dis-
appointment to its proponents. 2 To appreciate the decision's
perceived promise, and the reasons for its widespread rejection
* Professor and Willard Pedrick Distinguished Research Scholar, Sandra Day
O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University. http://www.law.asu.edu/Home
Pages/Ellman/. Many thanks are owed Debbie Oelze for her intelligent and re-
sourceful research assistance.
1. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
2. It was said, for example, that to exclude earning capacity from the marital
estate "makes a mockery of the equal division rule." LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE
DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR
WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 388 (1985). Once O'Brien was decided, it was
compared favorably with the contrasting Colorado decision in Marriage of Gra-
ham. E.g., Deborah A. Batts, Remedy Refocus: In Search of Equity in "Enhanced
Spouse/other Spouse" Divorces, 63 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 751 (1988). Later commentary
focused more broadly on perceived defects in divorce law, but highlighted the fail-
ure of other states to follow O'Brien as a major defect. E.g., ALLEN M. PARKMAN,
No-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? 7 (1992) ("[F]ailure to incorporate the
effects of marriage on the human capital of the spouses.., in any systematic way
is a major cause for divorced women suffering a substantial reduction in their wel-
fare."); Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning
the Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE
CROSSROADS 200 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990) ("An ap-
proach that ignores future earning capacity in defining marital resources will rein-
force gender disparities."); Joan C. Williams, Women and Property, in A PROPERTY
ANTHOLOGY 258-59 (Richard H. Chused 2d ed. 1997) (arguing that exclusion of
human capital from property plays a role in impoverishment of women). Remarka-
bly, the arguments for this position continue to be made. See, e.g., Carolyn J.
Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 107
(2004) (including earning capacity within the definition of marital property is nec-
essary to achieve egalitarian marriage).
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and its proponents' disappointment, one must first understand
the legal context within which the decision arose.
A. The legal setting of O'Brien.
American marital property law changed during the 1960s
and 1970s. Before then, most states made title the single most
important factor in allocating property between divorcing
spouses. A husband retained sole ownership in his earnings
during marriage and in any property purchased in his name.
The same would be true for the wife, but few wives then earned
very much. A husband might make a gift of some assets to his
wife, by putting them in joint title. But nothing, apart from so-
cial pressures, required such transfers. The usual result then,
under the traditional common law rules, was a large disparity
in wealth between divorcing husbands and wives.
In principle, that disparity might be reduced by an award of
alimony requiring a husband to make weekly or monthly sup-
port payments to his former wife. But such awards to wives
were largely within the discretion of the trial judge. Some re-
ceived generous awards; others did not. Many received less than
had been ordered, because cost-effective enforcement tools were
not available. So overall, the alimony system did not provide
divorced wives a satisfactory substitute for a property share.
During the mid-20th century, common law states began to
soften the traditional English property rules. A common law
court of equity could always look beyond formal title to real ben-
eficial ownership, when the two diverged. Some divorce courts
would rely on this power to aid the wife who had contributed
her labor or earnings to the acquisition of property on the un-
derstanding it would be jointly owned, even if her husband
alone held formal title. But such adjustments offered little to
the typical wife of this era who made few direct financial contri-
butions to the couple's accumulated property. Over time, how-
ever, some common law courts extended this traditional
equitable authority to recognize the wife's domestic contribu-
tions as well as her financial contributions to the property's ac-
quisition.3 These states planted the seed upon which later
reforms were built.
3. HOMER CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 450-51 (1968).
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As divorce rates began to climb in the mid 1960s, the im-
portance of economic injustice at divorce became more salient.
Reform of marital property laws seemed more promising than
breathing life into alimony. Property claims assert ownership
and entitlement, while alimony claims feel like pleas for char-
ity. Property claims were also more reliable because they were
final judgments, enforceable (like any other civil judgment) by
attachment and seizure if necessary. Some states had already
used equitable remedies to soften the English rules, providing
plausibility to reform efforts in other states. Reformers had a
ready model to point to-the community property system that
prevailed in Louisiana and seven western and southwestern
states (including California and Texas), which traced their mar-
ital property laws to continental roots. Community property
treats everything earned by either spouse during marriage as
their joint property regardless of the title in which it is held.
Reformers hoped for analogous rules in the common law states
that would entitle both spouses to share at divorce in property
acquired during their marriage, without regard to title. By fo-
cusing on property earned during marriage, rather than prop-
erty a spouse brought into the marriage or inherited, reformers
borrowed the community property classification rules even
thought they avoided the label "community property" in favor of
"marital property."
The community property classification rules are important
because the more well-defined and narrow the class of property
subject to equitable reallocation, the more specific can be the
allocation rules. The equal allocation of community property
would not make sense to most people if the pot included prop-
erty a spouse inherited, or owned before the marriage. Such
"separate property" is normally confirmed to its owner in com-
munity property states. The question was whether the common
law states would move to a similar system, with well-defined
and comprehensive rules for characterizing property as marital
or separate, or would instead leave such classifications vague,
put all property in the pot and rely on trial courts' equitable
discretion to allocate it reasonably. Looking back today on what
happened, one observes a shift over time toward clear classifica-
tion rules combined with a presumption that marital property is
20071 951
3
PACE LAW REVIEW
divided equally. That movement has gone further, and taken
less time, in some states than in others.
Looking forward from the 1970s, one might have expected
New York to move more slowly than most. New York did not
adopt equitable distribution until 1980, by which time it was
one of only three remaining common law title states.4 Moreo-
ver, up to the very moment of New York's delayed legislative
reform, its courts were among the most faithful in the nation in
adhering to the technical strictures of the common law system.
They rejected to the very end the flexible equitable doctrines
accepted by other common law courts. In one famous example 5
husband and wife had jointly decided to invest the husband's
entire salary while living exclusively on the wife's earnings. The
investments were titled in the husband's name, and he claimed
them all at their divorce fifteen years later.6 The wife, claiming
half their value, pointed out that her husband was only able to
invest his income because she had supported the family-his
duty under the New York law that then prevailed. 7 But the
New York court gave her nothing because she could not show an
explicit promise by the husband to hold half the investments in
trust for her, commenting that she "really seeks ... a commu-
nity property division under the guise of equitable relief."8
Reformers who had been trying for years to change New
York law got their chance in 1979 when the United States Su-
preme Court decided Orr v. Orr.9 Orr held that Alabama vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause by allowing wives but not
husbands to qualify for alimony by showing need. 10 Because
compliance with Orr required New York to amend its divorce
law to make it gender-neutral, the Judiciary Committee of the
New York State Senate, which had for the past three years held
up all reform bills, now had no choice but to report out divorce
4. 1980 N.Y. Laws 281, amending N.Y. DoM.REL.LAw § 236. The other two
laggards were Virginia and West Virginia. See Brian Diamond & William A. Prin-
sell, Note, New York's Equitable Distribution Law: A Sweeping Reform, 47 Brook.
L. Rev. 67, 67-68 nn. 1-2 (1980). Both these states soon followed.
5. Fisher v. Wirth, 326 N.Y.S.2d 308 (App. Div. 1971).
6. Id. at 310.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
10. Id. at 283.
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reform legislation." Seven members of the state senate jointly
introduced a bill to comply with Orr, but the legislative memo-
randum explained that it would also "establish a new concept of
support and distribution of property by implementation of the
terms 'maintenance,' 'distributive award,' and 'marital prop-
erty."' 12 The bill was passed on June 19, 1980, and signed by
the Governor three days later on June 22.13
In the 30-day period between final passage and the effec-
tive date of July 19, many spouses raced to commence divorce
actions to avoid their property's distribution under the new law.
The local legal newspaper reported a "land-office business" for
process servers and private detectives seeking to serve sum-
monses on non-titled spouses, many of whom, it was said, had
chosen that particular 30-day period to take out of state
vacations.14
Although Michael and Loretta O'Brien had separated in
April of 1980, Michael was not among those urgently seeking to
file for divorce before July 19. Having been a student for the
past four years, he had education loans to repay but little tangi-
ble property, and little reason to think he had any personal
stake in the legal changes governing the allocation of property
at divorce. When Michael left their New York apartment in
April, he took only a duffel bag of clothes, his grandfather's
rocking chair, his four guitars and a stereo, leaving the rest of
their modest property for Loretta.15 Soon after, Michael took
the examination for his New York medical license. Having re-
ceived no notice of the results, he called Albany in November of
1980, and learned his license had been issued in October. No-
tice had been sent to his old apartment, where Loretta still
11. See HENRY H. FOSTER, JR., A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE NEW YORK EQUITA-
BLE DISTRIBUTION DIVORCE LAW 41-45 (1980).
12. NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF LEGISLATION, A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE NEW YORK EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION DIVORCE LAW, 597-606
(Henry H. Foster, Jr. ed., Law & Business, Inc., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1980).
13. N.Y. DoM.REL.LAw § 236.
14. Myrna Felder, Courts, Legislature Struggle to Answer Property Questions,
N.Y.L.J., July 19, 1990, at 1.
15. David Margolick, Key Ruling Due on Ex-Wife Seeking A Share of Medical
License's Value, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1985, § 1, at 34.
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lived, and so she had known he had his medical license long
before he did. 16 She would soon claim partial ownership in it.
Michael O'Brien, M.D., finally filed for divorce in December
of 1980. His delay came back to haunt him.
B. The O'Briens' Story17
Michael O'Brien was born in 1947 and grew up in the
Bronx. His father, Eugene O'Brien, was a bank president.
Michael attended several New York area colleges but withdrew
35 units short of his B.A. degree in English. He worked for a
year as an aide in the psychiatry department of the Albert Ein-
stein College of Medicine in New York, then joined the Army
Reserve when his student draft deferment ran out. He returned
to New York in 1969 after completing his six month reserve
duty. Then 22 years old, he sold shoes at Gimbel's department
store and took occasional night classes.' 8 Loretta Verzillo also
sold shoes at Gimbel's. 19 She had grown up in Yonkers, a com-
munity just north of the Bronx, where her father was an ac-
countant. She had earned a B.A. at the State University of New
York at New Palz in 1967. She was 24 when she met Michael at
Gimbel's. Their conversation soon went beyond shoes. They
were married in April 1971.20
Michael's 1980 complaint for divorce was drawn up by Vin-
cent Nesci, then a "local boy" (Michael's words) in Yonkers. Di-
vorce work was a sideline for Nesci, who had graduated from St.
Johns Law School nine years before, and he eventually gave it
up. 21 The complaint he filed for Michael alleged that Loretta
was guilty of cruel and inhuman treatment and constructive
abandonment. 22 Loretta' counterclaimed for divorce on the
ground of Michael's cruelty. In most American states neither
claim would be necessary, but both then and today, New York,
16. Telephone interview with Michael O'Brien, (Feb. 25, 2006) [hereinafter
Interview].
17. Loretta died on November 5, 2002, before research on this chapter began.
18. See Margolick, supra note 15, at 34.
19. Id.
20. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
21. Today Nesci is the managing partner of Nesci, Keane, Piekarski, Keogh &
Corrigan, a White Plains, New York firm specializing in the defense of tort claims,
labor relations, and environmental law.
22. O'Brien, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 802.
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alone among American states, refuses to allow divorce by mu-
tual consent. Couples who wish to end their marriage without
claims of fault must first obtain a legal separation, and then
live apart, pursuant to its terms, for at least a year before they
can formally dissolve their marriage. For most divorcing New
Yorkers, this delay is unwelcome, as are the additional costs of
the required multiple proceedings. So Michael and Loretta, like
most divorcing New Yorkers, ultimately stipulated to a fault
ground for divorce: Michael withdrew his complaint and offered
no defense to Loretta's revised claim for divorce on the ground
of abandonment. 23 The court could then terminate their mar-
riage without added delay, although their divorce could not be
wrapped up until they also agreed on its financial aspects. But
on the financial issues they did not agree: Loretta had financial
claims that Michael resisted. To understand those claims, we
return to the story of their marriage.
After marrying, Michael and Loretta both taught at St. Pe-
ters, a private school. Loretta's salary there was about $8,900,
and Michael's about $8,000. He also earned small amounts
playing guitar in a band. Michael finished the courses he
needed for his B.A. in English in 1972. Around this time he
began to think about going to medical school. Loretta believed
her family was responsible for Michael's decision. As she ex-
plained to a Times reporter, when her mother got sick shortly
after their marriage, her father "noted offhandedly that he
wished there were a doctor in the family, and Michael confessed
that was what he had always wanted to be.24 'My father said,
'Don't ever let money stop you from anything-if you want to be
a doctor, I'll mortgage my house," she recalled."25 Years later
Michael agreed that her father's offer might have "pushed him a
little bit," but it was not "the driving force" of his decision. 26 "I
went back to school because I wanted to."27 If Loretta's father
had not offered to help him financially, "I would have gotten the
money somehow, with other loans or from my parents, if need
23. Id.
24. Margolick, supra note 15, at 34.
25. Id.
26. Interview, supra note note 16.
27. Id.
2007] 955
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be." 28 Whatever the impetus, Michael tried a chemistry course
and apparently surprised himself by doing well. 29 He then
spent a year taking pre-med classes at Hunter College in New
York.30 By September of 1973 he was ready to begin medical
school in Guadalajara, Mexico. 31 Classes were in Spanish,
which Michael had to learn in an intensive summer course
before medical school began.32 He became fluent, a "gift" he con-
tinues to use today with his many Spanish-speaking patients.33
Michael and Loretta lived in Guadalajara from September
of 1973 to December of 1976. While Michael attended medical
school, Loretta taught kindergarten in the mornings and gave
English lessons in the afternoon, working 35 to 40 hours a
week.34 Michael had no earnings but took out student loans.
During their divorce litigation Loretta told a reporter their life
in Mexico "was no picnic," that she had grilled cheese sand-
wiches for dinner every night for four years. 35 But Michael re-
called that the low Mexican cost of living allowed them a better
life than in New York. Maid service cost $2 a week, and at trial
Loretta agreed that housing and food cost them only $200 a
month, about half of what they earned.36 Nor were they iso-
lated; apart from the city's large number of American medical
students, an old friend of Loretta's had married a Mexican citi-
zen and lived nearby. Louis Verzillo, Loretta's father, initially
helped Michael with school expenses, but then "got in over his
head" with an investment in Boca Raton, and asked Michael's
parents if they could help. Embarrassed because they had not
known of Louis' help for their son, Michael's parents contrib-
uted to his remaining education expenses. 37 While Michael ini-
tially found medical school difficult he eventually did well, and
was accepted to complete his final two semesters of medical
training at Yonkers General Hospital in New York. He received
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.; Margolick, supra note 15, at 34.
31. Interview, supra note 16.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Margolick, supra note 15, at 34.
35. See id.
36. See Transcript of Record at 117, O'Brien v. O'Brien, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801
(Sup. Ct. 1982)
37. Id. at 244-45.
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his M.D. degree in December of 1977 and entered a residency in
internal medicine.
Loretta resumed teaching at St. Peter's when she and
Michael returned to New York in January of 1977.38 She again
considered studying for the permanent certificate required to
teach in public schools 39 but decided against it. She did not
want to spend her $2,000 savings on school: "I had one more
year to work and then I was going to retire and he was going to
work."40 Their marriage, however, had apparently been in diffi-
culty for some time. Michael testified at trial that when they
left for Mexico in 1973 the state of their marriage was "abys-
mally poor."41 He wanted children but they never had sexual
relations during the marriage. The trial judge excluded the fur-
ther evidence Michael offered to show Loretta's refusal to en-
gage in sexual relations. But Michael did testify that their
constant fighting "made it difficult for me to concentrate on my
work a great deal of the time."42 After their return to New York
he took refuge in working long hours, and was not home that
much. He later recalled that arguments aside, he and Loretta
had not spoken for months by the time he moved out in April of
1980. Michael thought it should have been obvious to Loretta
that their marriage was in great jeopardy, but she was
"stunned" when Michael announced his intention to leave. In-
deed, even after learning Michael had begun living with Patti
Rossini, a nurse whom he had met, she said she told her lawyer
that she did not want a divorce.
Michael's resolve, however, had only strengthened. He
found in Patti what he had not had with Loretta. Patti was
pregnant, and Michael was anxious to marry her and begin a
new family life. He was now pursuing a residency in Cleveland,
where Patti and their new child would join him. Nesci told
Michael that Loretta was avoiding process, but she was finally
served on Christmas Day of 1980. 43 Michael, disenchanted with
38. Margolick, supra note 15, at 34.
39. Transcript supra note 36, at 55.
40. Id. at 91.
41. Id. at 242.
42. Id. at 242-43.
43. Id. The record shows process was served on December 25, 1980, and
Michael said much was made of this at the trial. Id. Inexplicably, Loretta's pub-
lished account in the Ladies' Home Journal says she was served with the divorce
20071 957
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Nesci, replaced him with Andy Yankwitt, who had represented
Patti in her custody dispute with her former husband.
About ten months later, Michael and Andy met with
Loretta's lawyer, Albert Emanuelli, at Emanuelli's office in the
White Plains Republican Party headquarters. There they
learned that Loretta planned to claim that New York's new eq-
uitable distribution law gave her a marital property interest in
Michael's medical license. The question of whether property
claims could be made on degrees and licenses was a subject of
active discussion among family law academics at the time. 44
Most courts decided against the claim, but the handful allowing
it received wide publicity. One was a New Jersey trial court
which had held, less than a year before this White Plains meet-
ing, that a medical degree was property under New Jersey's
new equitable distribution law.45 That decision, Lynn v. Lynn,
undoubtedly caught the attention of New York area divorce law-
yers. The trial court was ultimately reversed, but not until De-
cember of 1982, after the O'Brien trial had ended, and it is
likely that Emanuelli had Lynn in mind. He was motivated to
look for an unconventional remedy in any event, rather than
alimony, now renamed maintenance. That is because, unknown
then to Michael or his lawyer, Loretta planned to remarry.
That meant that an award of maintenance, even if based on
Michael's future income as a physician, would have little value
for her because maintenance awards ended automatically when
the recipient remarried. But if she could convert Michael's fu-
ture income into marital property in which she had an owner-
ship interest, her claim would be unaffected by her remarriage.
C. The Trial
The trial began on January 18, 1982, thirteen months after
service, before Judge Richard J. Daronco of the Westchester
County Supreme Court. It began with the required charade of
establishing the fault necessary for an immediate judgment of
divorce. Loretta testified that she had always been "a loyal,
papers "at school" in " early January." Loretta O'Brien, It's Not Easy to Be a Wo-
man Today, LADIEs' HOME JOURNAL, Nov. 1982 at 40.
44. See Margolick, supra note 15, at 34.
45. Lynn v Lynn, NJ Super Ct, No. M - 9842 - 8, Dec. 5, 1981, rev'd, 453 A.2d
539 (N.J. 1982).
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faithful and dutiful wife" and that Michael refused to cohabit
with her. Yankwitt waived cross-examination and Loretta's
claim for divorce was granted. Emanuelli then called Michael
who testified he was earning $17,000 a year as a first-year sur-
gical resident at the Fairview Hospital in Cleveland, but might
leave this program to take an offer for an internal medicine
residency leading to a faculty position at New York Medical Col-
lege. 46 Loretta testified they both worked full time, with
equivalent pay, from the time of their marriage through June of
1972, when Michael finished the night classes he needed to
complete the credits for his B.A. degree. They agreed that
Loretta controlled their marital finances: Michael gave her all
his earnings, including the cash payments he received for play-
ing guitar. Emanuelli had Loretta provide a detailed account-
ing of their marriage.
Loretta testified she earned $8,400 during the 1972-73 aca-
demic year, while Michael attended Hunter College full-time;
$11,600 during the next three and a half years in Mexico; and
$33,200 during the three and a half years from January 1977,
when they returned to New York, through June of 1980, when
Michael completed the training needed to obtain his degree and
license. In total, then, Loretta testified to earnings of $53,200
during the entire period of Michael's training. Michael later
testified on direct examination to earnings of $17,550 over these
same years, and to education loans on which he alone was liable
of $10,000. So Michael contributed $27,550 to their marriage
over the course of his training, $25,650 less than Loretta.47
Their income went to pay for both their living expenses and
costs directly associated with Michael's education. Loretta tes-
tified that over the course of these nine years Michael paid
$27,500 in tuition: $2,500 a semester for the seven semesters
from the fall of 1973 through the end of 1977, and an additional
$10,000 during 1978 and 1979. There was also testimony about
the contributions of both sets of in-laws. Loretta's father
claimed payments of $9,800 toward Michael's tuition, while
Michael's mother testified to $10,000 in payments. Despite
some gaps and slight inconsistencies in the evidence overall, it
46. See O'Brien, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 802.
47. Oddly, Loretta testified that Michael had taken out $15,000 in loans,
$5,000 more than Michael himself claimed. Transcript supra note 16, at 61-87.
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appeared the two sets of in-laws made approximately equal con-
tributions to the direct costs of Michael's education.
The judge and both lawyers assumed Loretta's accounting
was important to her claim, yet the connection was not really
clear. If Michael's medical license and degree were marital
property, then Loretta's entitlement to share in their value
could not depend upon her financial contribution to their acqui-
sition. After all, a key purpose of the new marital property sys-
tem was to protect the spouse whose contributions to the
marriage were not market labor. Nonetheless, it seemed a good
bet that New York, which was among the most reluctant of con-
verts to equitable distribution, might have particular trouble di-
gesting this idea. It would not therefore be surprising if the
judge and both attorneys thought Loretta's financial contribu-
tions were important to her property claim on Michael's profes-
sional credentials. There was also a second possible reason for
Loretta's accounting: if her claim for ownership in Michael's de-
gree were rejected, she would want at least a claim for reim-
bursement of her financial contributions to its acquisition. In
fact, as the law developed, such reimbursement is the remedy
that states recognize; New York alone rejects it in favor of an
ownership interest in the degree. So Loretta's lawyer might
have been hedging his bets, laying the foundation for a reim-
bursement claim in case his more ambitious claim of shared
ownership failed.
Central to Loretta's claim was the testimony of her expert,
Stanley Goodman, a lawyer and CPA He began by focusing on
Loretta's financial contributions to the marriage and divorce,
relative to Michael's. His calculation was based on hypothetical
figures crediting Loretta with contributions at least $5,000
more than she even claimed. This factual error was com-
pounded by a conceptual one: he credited Loretta with her fa-
ther's gifts, but did not credit Michael with his parent's gifts, or
with the education loans for which Michael alone was liable.
But Yankwitt failed to press Goodman on these points, leaving
standing his conclusion that over the course of the marriage
Loretta contributed $61,500 more than Michael. Goodman then
converted this $61,500 figure to a 1982 present value of
[Vol. 27:949960
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol27/iss4/14
O'BRIEN V. O'BRIEN
$103,930.48 Judge Daronco accepted this $103,390 figure and it
became entrenched in later descriptions of the case, even
though it was obtained by applying an incoherent method to in-
correct facts.
If the purpose of Goodman's testimony was to help calcu-
late a reimbursement claim, his method also ignored available
precedent suggesting the appropriate method. The Minnesota
Supreme Court's opinion in DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, decided
the year before the O'Brien trial, is often cited on this point. 49 It
also involved a wife who had supported her husband during
medical school. 50 It calculated his educational expenses by ad-
ding his school fees to half the couple's living expenses during
his education.5 1 The shortfall between this total, and his own
dollar contributions, is the amount his wife might have covered
through her earnings, for which she was allowed reimburse-
ment.52 One can see this calculation excludes reimbursement
for the wife's payments toward her own living expenses, as well
as other unrelated expenditures (such as family gifts).5 3 De La
Rosa has been widely followed, although some states limit reim-
bursement to the direct costs of school, excluding the student's
spouse's living expenses as well as claimant's, and do not in-
clude the student-spouse's living expenses.5 4  Goodman's
method, followed nowhere, would by contrast have allowed
Loretta reimbursement for everything she earned during the
marriage, whether it was spent on Michael's education, on her
own living expenses, or on Christmas gifts to her family.55
48. . Emanuelli also elicited from Goodman an estimate that the market value
of Loretta's housework for Michael, assuming she spent an hour a day at it, was
$25 a week, or $1,300 a year. But nothing was ever made of this portion of his
testimony.
49. DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981). Other state su-
preme courts which reached essentially the same decision at about the same time
include Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1982) and Hubbard v. Hubbard,
603 P.2d 747, 750-53 (Okla. 1979).
50. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d at 756.
51. Id. at 759.
52. Id. at 758-59.
53. See id. at 759, n. 9.
54. E.g., Bold v. Bold, 574 A.2d 552 (Pa. 1990); CAL. FAM. CODE § 2641 (West
1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11(d) (Michie Supp. 1996).
55. See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801, 806 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
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But Goodman's main purpose was to support Loretta's
claim to share the degree's value, rather than to reimburse-
ment. He said Loretta's financial contributions were a reason
why she had a property interest in Michael's degree and license.
"Mrs. O'Brien is no less a partner in this license than she would
have been if nine years ago Dr. O'Brien had opened up a retail
store and he now had four retail stores and she worked beside
him to get the retail stores."56 But that view evidenced a funda-
mental misunderstanding of equitable distribution. The wife
who never set foot in Goodman's hypothetical store, but instead
spent the entire marriage engaged in domestic tasks, is also a
"partner" with a claim to share the value of this retail business.
That was the whole point of the equitable distribution reform.57
That Goodman's confused understanding went unchallenged in
the courtroom reflected the primitive state then of both New
York law and the thinking of New York domestic relations bar
on this subject. They simply had not yet digested the real
revolution inherent in equitable distribution: shared ownership
of marital property is presumed, and is not dependent on a
spouse having made any direct contribution of labor or capital
to its acquisition.
Goodman testified to both the legal issue-were Michael's
medical credentials marital property?-as well as the factual is-
sue-what were the credentials worth?58 He grounded his sup-
port of Loretta's legal claim in part on her financial
contributions, the questionable relevance of which we have just
reviewed; but Goodman's second argument was that Michael
did not yet have an established practice to value, so that "we are
56. Transcript supra note 36, at 27-35.
57. Judge Daronco did correctly say that under the new Domestic Relations
Law marital property was meant to include " property... attributable to the ex-
penditure or effort by either spouse," O'Brien, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 805, which of course
means a wife has claims on property acquired entirely through the husband's ef-
fort, because it is marital property. Common law states came to understand that
the equitable distribution reforms would work very little change if a spouse's claim
on marital assets depended upon the extent of her financial contribution to their
acquisition. That is why their statutes, either initially or after amendment, in-
clude "homemaker" provisions directing courts to credit a wife's domestic contribu-
tions. New York has such a provision, N.Y. DOM. REL. § 236(B)(5)(d)(6) (in
allocating marital property, the court should consider "services as a spouse, par-
ent, wage earner and homemaker").
58. Id. at 805.
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forced" (Gooodman's words) to value the degree. 59 But of course,
one is "forced" only if one begins the inquiry already committed
to finding marital property to value. But that was of course the
question before the court. It also seems difficult to argue, as a
matter of property law, that whether or not the degree is prop-
erty depends upon whether there is other property around to
which Loretta can lay claim. Yankwitt never pressed Goodman
to make any such property law argument. One can guess, how-
ever, that Goodman's focus was on equity, not property law: if
there were other assets the court could give Loretta then there
was no need to value the degree, but otherwise there was.
But such an approach assumes the new equitable distribu-
tion law did not change marital property rules, but replaced
them with unrestrained and largely undefined judicial discre-
tion to create and alter each parties' financial assets. As it
turned out, New York alone, effectively endorsed this radical
reading. Other states read their law to give courts equitable
authority in allocating property; but not in defining the prop-
erty subject to this equitable allocation. This New York differ-
ence began with Goodman's opinion.60 Whether New York
would have adopted a different position had Michael offered his
own expert to challenge Goodman we cannot know.
Pressed by Yankwitt for legal authority to support his view,
Goodman conceded 6' that Lynn v. Lynn-the recent New Jersey
trial court decision that would later be reversed 62-was all he
had. On redirect Emanuelli, now free to ask Goodman about
case law, elicited other citations from him. Although the cita-
tions were largely off-point,63 they interested Judge Daronco,
59. Transcript supra note 36, at 25-42.
60. See O'Brien, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 806.
61. Transcript supra note 36, at 192.
62. Lynn v Lynn, NJ Super Ct, No. M - 9842 - 8, Dec. 5, 1981, rev'd, 453 A.2d
539 (N.J. 1982).
63. E.g., Moss v. Moss, 264 N.W.2d 97 (Mich. 1978); Inman v. Inman, 578
S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979), rev'd, 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1982). Technically, this
court accepted the lower court's characterization of the degree as property, but
expressed concern about this ruling and held that the employed wife's claim would
be limited to the value of her contributions to her student-husband's education.
Inman, 578 S.W.2d at 270. The case thus did not in fact support Loretta's claim for
a share in the value of Michael's future earnings. See id. Just months after the
O'Brien trial, the same court held clearly that a degree was not property, when the
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who asked questions himself.64 It seems likely Yankwitt hurt
Michael's case by opening this line of questioning, giving Good-
man's legal views more credibility than was justified by the
precedents he cited.
Yankwitt's failure to present their own expert also left him
unable to counter Goodman's valuation of Michael's license and
degree, the most important portion of Goodman's testimony.
That valuation was based upon Goodman's projections of
Michael's future earnings.65 Assuming he would finish his sur-
gery residency in 1985, Goodman projected Michael's total in-
come as a surgeon over a 27-year career from 1985 to 2012,
when Michael would turn 65.66 From that total he deducted his
estimate of the income an average college graduate would earn
over the same period, to arrive at the additional future income
he attributed to Michael's surgical training.67 He then calcu-
lated the present value, as of the time of the trial in 1982, of
that additional future income. 68 Such calculations employed as-
sumptions about the appropriate interest rate, the inflation
rate, the change in average earnings that both college gradu-
ates and surgeons would experience in the future, and the tax
rates that would apply over time to both hypothetical incomes.69
His estimate of the present value of Michael's additional future
income was $472,000.70 Goodman freely admitted that the cal-
culations would be different with different assumptions about
Michael's life expectancy or career path, and Yankwitt made no
headway trying to cast doubt on Goodman's particular choices.
Yankwitt pressed Goodman on his assumption that
Michael would become a surgeon, but could not show why that
assumption was more problematic than any other assumption
one might make about Michael's eventual specialization. But
this entire exchange missed a far more fundamental problem
same case returned to it on appeal after remand. Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d
847 (Ky. 1982).
64. Sometimes the trial judge seemed to help Yankwitt out. See Transcript
supra note 36, at 204-05.
65. O'Brien, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 806.
66. Transcript supra note 36, at 21-25.
67. Id..
68. Id.
69. O'Brien, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 806.
70. Id.
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with Goodman's analysis: the initial assumption that Michael's
choice of specialty mattered. It did not. The reason, of course,
that his future specialty was uncertain was that most all of the
training he would need to qualify for it was in the future, while
his filing of his divorce petition was in the past. That meant
that whatever specialty credentials Michael eventually earned
could not be marital property, even if they were property, be-
cause New York, like most states, treats assets acquired after
the divorce action's commencement as separate property, not
marital property. 71 As separate property, Michael's future cre-
dentials in his speciality were clearly beyond the court's alloca-
tion authority. They were Michael's alone even under
Goodman's own theory.72 So Goodman's calculations were en-
tirely wrong even if he was right that a license or degree earned
during the marriage was marital property. . Loretta had no
claim on specialization credentials Michael might earn later,
whether in surgery, internal medicine, or medical illustration.
Goodman's own theory required he project the income of a phy-
sician with an M.D. degree and license to practice, but with no
training or credential in any specialization at all. All the atten-
tion that courts, lawyers, and commentators gave to the specu-
lation inherent in projecting Michael's career choices somehow
missed this error in the calculations' basic premise.
D. The Trial Court Decision
Judge Daronco issued his memorandum opinion in June of
1982, six months after the trial had ended. He said the issue
was "whether or not contributions to a spouse's medical educa-
tion are subject to equitable distribution upon dissolution
.... 3 This odd construction misleadingly suggests Loretta's
claim is to her financial contributions, not to Michael's license,
but perhaps Daronco thought it helped to distinguish Lesman,
71. New York Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(1)(c) reads: "The term 'mari-
tal property' shall mean all property acquired by either or both spouses during the
marriage and before the .. .commencement of a matrimonial action ...." N.Y.
DoM. REL. § 236(B)(1)(c). Under local practice in New York, an action is com-
menced by serving the divorce summons.
72. New York Domestic Relations Law §§ 236(B)(5)(b) and (c) provide that:
"Separate property shall remain such" while "[miarital property shall be distrib-
uted equitably between the parties ...." N.Y. DoM. REL. § 236(B)(5)(b)-(c).
73. O'Brien. 452. N.Y.S.2d at 802.
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an Appellate Division decision, then just rendered, which re-
jected a wife's property claim on her husband's medical li-
cense.7 4 His opinion found Lesman inapplicable because the
Lesman wife had made no significant financial contributions to
her husband's education. But that distinction was inconsistent
with the rationale given in Lesman itself,75 as well as with New
York law as even Daronco described it elsewhere in his opin-
ion.76 Moreover, given his emphasis on the importance of
Loretta's financial contributions to her claim, his factual find-
ings of their amount were surprisingly casual, in three impor-
tant respects.
The first was his finding that the value of Loretta's contri-
butions to Michael's education was $103,390, the figure Good-
man reached by applying the questionable analysis described
above. 77 The second was his acceptance of Goodman's estimate
of Michael's future earnings, $472,000 in 1982 dollars, as the
value of the marital property share of his license, when those
projected earnings assumed surgical training that was not mar-
ital property under any theory. 78 The third was his finding that
Loretta contributed "76 percent of the couple's total income"
over the course of their marriage.79 One simply cannot derive
this figure from the evidence presented at trial. During their
marriage the couple earned $97,650 between them, of which
Loretta earned $62,100, or 63.5 percent, not 76 percent. During
the period in which Michael was a full time student Loretta's
contributions, $53,200, were 65 percent of their total of $80,750.
One can reach 75 percent by both focusing on this period of
74. Id. at 803.
75. Id. While Lesman v Lesman, 442 N.Y.S.2d 955 (Sup. Ct 1981), did men-
tion the wife's limited role, its conclusion that the license was not property seemed
grounded on its observations that it:
is not a commodity that can be sold, nor has it value to any other person
other than the holder thereof. It is an indicia of achievement and a legal
authorization to practice medicine only in the State where it is granted. In
and of itself it cannnot [sic] produce any income.
Id. at 957.
76. Later in his opinion Daronco correctly described the New York statute as
treating an asset as marital property so long as its acquisition resulted from the
"effort by either spouse." O'Brien, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 805 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 806.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 803.
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Michael's education, and also excluding from his contributions
the tuition loans that he alone was liable to repay-an exclusion
that obviously makes no sense. Despite its mysterious origin,
this 76 percent figure seemed to acquire a central importance as
the case was appealed, as we shall see.
Judge Daronco also found that Loretta "relinquished" the
opportunity to earn her permanent teaching certificate so that
Michael "could obtain his educational goals."8 0 With this find-
ing he suggests she is entitled to compensation for her sacri-
fice.81 But did she make a sacrifice for Michael? It depends on
her reason for not seeking the certificate: was it in fact to ac-
commodate Michael's plans, or did she have another reason that
would have led her to make the same choice no matter what
Michael's plans were? Daronco's opinion does not consider the
evidence that had been presented at trial on this question. That
evidence suggested Michael's plans were not important to
Loretta's decision. Loretta made no effort to pursue the certifi-
cate during the four years between her college graduation and
her marriage, a time during which she spent more on vacations
than the required courses would have cost her. Nor did she pur-
sue it after the couple's return to New York from Mexico, de-
spite Michael's encouragement.8 2 Loretta would need the
certificate to teach in the public schools (at higher pay) but not
to continue teaching in the Catholic Church schools. Loretta in
fact taught in Catholic schools her entire life, including after
her second marriage.
On the law, Judge Daronco held that the new equitable dis-
tribution law authorized wide-ranging trial court discretion,
"cast[ing] aside the traditional concepts of property in seeking
equitable concepts and fairness in the multitude of variations in
marital situations and the equities involved. '83 That legal con-
clusion made his factual findings the entire ball game, because
they were the only basis upon which that discretion might be
exercised. Without offering any explanation, he concluded that
a "fair financial redress" for Loretta would be 40 percent of the
80. Id. at 802.
81. See id.
82. Transcript supra note 36, at 55.
83. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801, 804 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
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value that Goodman had placed on Michael's medical license,
which came to $188,800.84
After reviewing this decision Michael and Andy agreed they
were "in over their head" and that Michael needed another law-
yer to handle his appeal.8 5 Andy recommended Willard H. Da-
Silva, a highly regarded domestic relations specialist, a
Columbia Law School graduate, and a member of the New York
bar since 1949.86 A frequent contributor to journals and books
read by other domestic relations lawyers, active in several Bar
Associations, a lecturer at several New York area law schools,
and just chosen for the next edition of The Best Lawyers in
America, DaSiva was a good choice.8 7 He was still conducting an
active practice in February, 2006, as one of only 95 attorneys
nationwide invited to be a Diplomate of the American College of
Family Trial Lawyers.88 He could see that Andy Yankwitt had
made a serious mistake in offering no expert of his own to
counter Goodman, especially as his cross-examination of Good-
man was ineffective. He set out to do the best he could, given
this handicap, in getting the trial court decision reversed.
E. The Appellate Division Proceedings
DaSilva's Appellate Division brief made four main points:89
a. The trial court read the statute incorrectly. The statute
gives courts the authority to make an equitable division of mari-
tal property, not a broad right to make any monetary award the
court believes fair. The statute does not make formal educa-
tion, or the development of the human brain generally, into
property. Lynn, the New Jersey trial court decision to the con-
trary that was relied upon by Judge Daronco, was since re-
versed by the New Jersey Supreme Court.90 An appropriate
equitable remedy, restitution, can be ordered without distorting
the statutory meaning of property.
84. Margolick, supra note 15, at 34; O'Brien, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 806.
85. Interview, supra note 16.
86. Telephone interview with Willard H. DaSilva, (Feb. 17, 2006).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, O'Brien v. O'Brien, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1985).
90. Lynn v Lynn, NJ Super Ct, No. M - 9842 - 8, Dec. 5, 1981, rev'd, 453 A.2d
539 (N.J. 1982).
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b. The precedent set by the trial court's holding cannot be
confined to a small group of cases. A rule that degrees and li-
censes are property must logically apply to all cases, not just
those in which there are no other assets. And it cannot logically
be limited to medical licenses, which for this purpose cannot be
distinguished from real estate licenses, liquor licenses, barbers'
licenses, chauffeur licenses, or restaurant licenses. 91
c. The trial court offered no legal principle to guide the
award's amount or explain its choice of 40 percent of the license's
presumed value, which was therefore entirely arbitrary.92
d. Loretta's disappointment in the marriage's failure pro-
vided no equitable basis for the award. Michael was also disap-
pointed in the marriage's failure and in her refusal to engage in
sexual relations and to have children, but his disappointments
were improperly excluded by the trial court.93 The court cannot
assume Loretta assisted Michael in becoming a doctor given his
evidence that her behavior, and their constant fighting, bur-
dened Michael's efforts.94
Emanuelli's reply brief for Loretta described the case as one
of many involving innocent spouses who needed protection from
the overreaching behavior of exploitative spouses. The first sen-
tence set its tone: "The case at bar presented the all too typical
'medical license syndrome' situation where shortly after the
professional receives (his) license, (he) serves his spouse with a
divorce summons." While adhering to Loretta's position at trial
that the degree is property only when there are no other marital
assets, 95 the brief effectively conceded that the trial court's hold-
ing had potentially far-reaching impact by admitting that to
value a license is to value the license holder's enhanced earning
capacity: "They are one and the same."96 By this time decisions
from other states rejecting Loretta's position had begun to accu-
mulate, and in apparent response Emanuelli's brief repeatedly
91. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 24, O'Brien v. O'Brien, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548
(N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
92. Id. at 34.
93. Id. at 47, 54.
94. Id. at 54.
95. Reply Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 18, O'Brien v. O'Brien, 485
N.Y.S.2d 548 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
96. Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 35, O'Brien v. O'Brien, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548
(N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
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characterizes phrases in the New York statute as "unique." Yet
the brief never explained why these highlighted phrases sup-
port treatment of degrees or licenses as property, nor does it
ever actually show, by comparisons to provisions in other state
statutes, that New York's language is in fact different.97 (Da-
Silva's reply provided interstate statutory comparisons to rebut
Emanuelli's claim that New York's statute was unique. 98 ) Fi-
nally, Emanuelli argued that New York's law would not permit
the kind of alimony or reimbursement remedies other states
employed in these cases, and that therefore the only remedy the
court could provide Loretta was the property remedy she
sought. The brief is often rambling and occasionally uses puz-
zling aphorisms such as "Valuation is neither a science nor an
art."
99
Given the disparity in the quality of their appellate briefs,
one might have expected Michael to prevail, and he did. How-
ever, the appellate division decision, handed down February 11,
1985, was split. The three-judge majority held squarely that
neither license nor degree is property, whether at common law
or under New York's equitable distribution statute. Character-
izing Loretta as relying on the "reification" of Michael's medical
license to claim a percentage of his future earning potential,
they found nothing in the Equitable Distribution Law or its leg-
islative history to suggest the legislature's intention "to vest a
proprietary right in one spouse in the other spouse's very per-
son."100 If the legislature really meant to adopt Loretta's "novel"
and "sui generis" view of marital property, it would have used
statutory language that made this clear, 101 but the statutory
language does not support this view, explicitly or implicitly.'0 2
The statute's provision for distributing cash in lieu of a "burden-
some" or unlawful property share in "a business, corporation, or
97. For example, the brief argues that New York "has been careful to avoid
the vagueness and lack of specificity which has plagued other jurisdictions and led
to their inability to adequately deal with the professional license syndrome on a
present value basis.", Id. at 30. No specific comparison of statutory language
across states is offered to explain or support this point.
98. Michael's reply brief on appeal at 3-4.
99. Id. at 33.
100. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548, 550 (App. Div. 1985).
101. Id. at 551.
102. Id.
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profession" has no contrary implication because the context
makes clear it applies to a profession established during the
marriage, which would be marital property under conventional
understandings. 0 3 The provision thus had an important func-
tion without stretching its meaning to apply where "there is no
marital property to distribute." 0 4
The majority agreed Loretta might have been treated
badly, if Michael indeed walked out on her after accepting her
support for his education. But earlier appellate division cases
had held marital fault (apart from "egregious" misconduct) ir-
relevant to property allocation, precluding reliance on this pos-
sible wrong to justify the trial court's award. 0 5 This analysis
was astute, and especially relevant because the Court of Ap-
peals later relied on this same no-fault principle to affirm the
trial court's exclusion of Michael's proffered evidence that
Loretta had refused sexual relations throughout their mar-
riage. 0 6 One cannot rely on no-fault rules to bar Michael from
explaining why he left the marriage, but then consider him at
fault for having left. But such an improper assumption of
Michael's fault was implicit in Emanuelli's characterization of
the case as an example of "medical license syndrome." If blame
for ending the marriage were to be considered, then Michael's
evidence had to be allowed. New York is in fact in line with the
law of most states in generally barring consideration of fault in
marital property allocations, and there are very good reasons
for the position it takes. But that New York rule meant that the
court could not justify a property award to Loretta with the as-
sumption that Michael was to blame for the marriage's end.
Finally, the majority suggested that on remand the trial
court do equity by making two distinct maintenance awards to
103. IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL, FAMILY LAw: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 298-315,
324-62 (4th ed. 2005).
104. O'Brien, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 554.
105. Id. at 552.
106Michael] contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of
defendant's marital fault on the question of equitable distribution .... Ex-
cept in egregious cases which shock the conscience of the court, however, it
is not a 'just and proper' factor for consideration in the equitable distribu-
tion of marital property .... We have no occasion to consider [Loretta's]
fault... because there is no suggestion that she was guilty of fault sufficient
to shock the conscience.
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 719 (N.Y. 1985).
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Loretta. 0 7 First, an ordinary maintenance award sufficient to
"sustain" the "advanced life-style" she might have had as
Michael's wife, to continue "for a reasonable time."108 This
traditional award would end if Loretta remarried. But the ma-
jority suggested the trial court also "fashion a rehabilitative
award ... [to] cover all reasonable costs of her [Loretta's] post-
graduate studies leading towards a permanent teacher's certifi-
cate" and provided that this award should be paid even if
Loretta remarried. 0 9
The two-judge dissent read New York's statute more cre-
atively. Refusing to be bound by the statute's actual language,
they would have held that:
the concept of 'marital property' is a purely statutory creation
which must be used to accomplish what is fair and just in dividing
the attainments of the marriage, material or otherwise .... In
seeking to do equity it is unnecessary and unrealistic to rely solely
upon prior conventional concepts of property.110
This view echoed the suggestion of the trial court opinion
that New York had not changed its marital property rules so
much as replaced them altogether with a judicial authority to
make equitable rearrangements of the divorcing parties' fi-
nances."' Though without much textual authority, this con-
struction of the statute provided a convenient basis for
rendering irrelevant the mounting number of sister-state deci-
sions rejecting claims like Loretta's.
E. The New York Court of Appeals Proceedings
Emanuelli, now in the appellant role, was more focused in
his Court of Appeals brief. He pointed out that Goodman was
the only expert to testify. He said that Michael's claim that he
was inclined to pursue internal medicine rather than surgery
was a "sham." But the heart of his argument echoed the Appel-
late Division dissent: because the concept of marital property
was foreign to the common law, and entirely a creature of stat-
107. O'Brien, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 554-55.
108. Id. at 555.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 558 (Thompson, J. dissenting).
111. Id.
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ute, general arguments about the nature of property were irrel-
evant. A "narrow" definition of property would "arbitrarily
handcuff' the court in exercising its equitable authority to dis-
tribute property "acquired during the marriage.' 1 12 Arguing
again that the New York statute was unique, he quoted its list
of factors to consider in allocating marital property as if the list
were special,1 3 and characterized New York's provision for "dis-
tributive awards" as "ingenious" and unique. 114 Yet anyone fa-
miliar with the field knew that New York's list of factors was
entirely typical of equitable distribution statutes nationwide
and that "distributive award" was simply New York's odd label
for a commonplace legal concept: Every state recognizes that
some divorces involve marital or community assets that are im-
practical or inadvisable to divide, so that an equitable or equal
division requires an order requiring the spouse receiving the as-
set to make cash payments, in single lump sum or installments,
to the other spouse. 1 5 Such arrangements are especially com-
mon when a business managed by one spouse is the parties'
largest marital or community asset-precisely the case that the
Appellate Division suggested was the typical use intended for
the distributive award.1' 6
It is quite possible Emanuelli did not really understand just
how ordinary New York's rules were. Perhaps, like many New
York lawyers, his only frame of reference against which to view
New York's new law was New York's old law. The new law was
indeed revolutionary when compared to the old law it replaced,
even if unremarkable when compared to the law of the 47 other
states that had earlier adopted either equitable distribution, or
community property. 117 If Emanuelli was unaware of the na-
tional context, he was in good company. New York's courts and
112. Id. at 10.
113. Id. at 14.
114. Id. at 16-17.
115. IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL, FAMILY LAw: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS (4th ed.
2005).
116. See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548, 555 (App. Div. 1985).
117. An example of the timidity of New York's laws is a provision that treats
the appreciation of separate property, during marriage, as marital property "to the
extent that such appreciation is due in part to the contributions or efforts of the
other spouse." N.Y. DOM. REL. § 236(B)(d)(3). New Yorkers may see this as an
expansive provision, extending the reach of marital property. But, in fact, most
states treat the fruits of either spouse's labor during marriage as community or
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commentators have historically been provincial in their discus-
sions of family law issues. The best-known commentators on
New York family law during this era were Foster and Freed,
who were involved in drafting New York's equitable distribu-
tion reforms. But the contemporaneous edition of their treatise
sounds like Emanuelli's brief. "The Equitable Distribution Law
is a unique and perhaps esoteric statute tailor made for New
York and the device of the distributive award was invented for
New Yorkers."" 8 To say New York's law is unique in providing
for "distributive awards" is like saying it is unique in providing
for a Court of Appeals. New York's idiosyncratic choice of name
is unique, but the idea for which it stands is commonplace.
One might therefore see DaSilva's core task, as the O'Brien
came before the New York Court of Appeals, as persuading that
court that the case presented no special "New York" angle. His
brief made clear why differences in terminology did not change
the fact that claims like Loretta's had been rejected in sub-
stance by all the other states that had considered them. His
brief also laid out the conceptual difficulties of restricting a
claim like Loretta's to cases in which there are no other assets
(which Emanuelli's briefs suggested) or to cases involving pro-
fessional licenses and degrees. 1 9 The judicial inability to re-
strict the precedent in this way meant, DaSilva sought to show
the court, that widespread havoc would necessarily follow from
a decision favoring Loretta's property claim. He also challenged
both the long-term maintenance award that the Appellate Divi-
sion allowed in lieu of the property claim it rejected, the lower
courts' exclusion of Michael's evidence of Loretta's fault, and the
absence of any basis for the trial court's award to Loretta of 40
percent of the degree's purported value, rather than any other
percentage the court might have arbitrarily chosen.
DaSilva felt confident going into the oral argument, and not
only because he believed the law favored his position. He as-
marital property, a significant difference. See A.L.I. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 4.05(1) cmt. b (2000).
118. The text continues: "This means decisions from other states . . .which
have substantially different statutes . . . are irrelevant. . . ." Henry H. Foster, Jr.,
Doris J. Freed, & Joel R. Brandes, Law and the Family, N.Y. Equitable Distribu-
tion Law, 666-67 (2d Ed. Lawyers Cooperative 1986).
119. Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, O'Brien v. O'Brien, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548
(App. Div. 1985).
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sumed Loretta would be allowed either a generous maintenance
award, or a property share in his medical license, but believed
he would obtain an acceptable result for Michael either way.
He knew Loretta had secretly remarried, which meant that any
maintenance award allowed by the Court of Appeals would end
before it began.120 And if the Court instead allowed the prop-
erty claim, DaSilva planned to renew a settlement offer
Emanuelli had rejected three times before-before and after the
trial court decision, and after the decision in the Appellate Divi-
sion.121 He was confident, however, that this time Emanuelli
would accept it, a point to which we shall return.
O'Brien v. O'Brien was argued before the New York Court
of Appeals on November 11, 1985. The court has seven judges.
The Chief Judge, Sol Wachtler, had been elected to the court in
1972, under a system of partisan elections that New York later
abandoned. He was appointed Chief Judge by Governor Cuomo
on January 2, 1985, only 10 months before the argument. Well-
regarded at the time, his career came to a surprising and humil-
iating end in 1992 with his conviction and imprisonment for
harassing both the socialite Republican fund-raiser who had en-
ded her affair with him, and her teenage daughter. 122 But in
1985 his fall from grace was still years away. Within a few
months Cuomo had two more appointments, Fritz Alexander
and Vito Titone. Only two years before Cuomo had appointed
Richard Simons and Judith Kaye, the first woman ever to serve
on the New York Court of Appeals. (Kaye was later to serve as
New York's first woman Chief Judge.) Of the seven judges,
then, only two were not recent Cuomo appointees. Mathew
Jasen had been elected to the court in 1967, and retired a
month after O'Brien was decided. Bernard Meyer was ap-
pointed by Governor Hugh Carey in 1979 and would retire in
1986, the year after the O'Brien decision.
120. "[An award of maintenance shall terminate upon ... the recipient's valid
or invalid marriage." N.Y. DOM. REL. § 236(B)(6)(c).
121. Telephone interview with Willard H. DaSilva, (Feb. 17, 2006).
122. Wachtler later claimed his problems arose from manic-depressive disor-
der for which he had refused treatment despite his wife's pleas. See, e.g., Judge
Not: Fall from Honor. How Sol Watchler went from Esteemed Chief Judge of New
York to Shamed Prison Inmate, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, July-August 1997, available
at http://psychologytoday.com/articles/pto-19970701-000027.html. He also wrote a
memoir of his 13 months of prison life, entitled, After the Madness.
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DaSilva later recalled that the prevailing view at the time
was that the property allocation reforms were coupled with a
change in the law of alimony-that along with the renaming of
alimony as maintenance was the intention to eliminate long-
term alimony awards. 123 The idea was that new property
awards would eliminate the need for alimony in most cases be-
cause they would be sufficient at least to provide transitional
assistance, which was all a newly divorced wife would need in
the new world of gender equality. 124 In that way, a "clean
break" between the divorcing parties could be achieved.
Emanuelli in fact offered this argument in his brief, claiming
the property remedy was necessary because maintenance (for-
merly called alimony), was now for limited time periods only.125
One who did not know of Loretta's secret remarriage might
have wondered why her lawyer was making an argument
against the generous maintenance award that the Appellate Di-
vision had directed in her favor. But the argument may have
been the most important that Emanuelli made. It did not mat-
ter that other states had by this time already begun to realize
that the goal of "clean break" was unrealistic. A clean break
could never be achieved where there were minor children, and
even where there were not, it became increasingly clear that
long-term alimony would still be appropriate at the dissolution
of many long marriages, at least. 26 But here as elsewhere, New
York's transition lagged behind. While the Court of Appeals did
not rule explicitly that long-term maintenance awards were
barred, it did indicate its understanding that the New York re-
forms were motivated in part by such a "clean break" philoso-
phy. 27 That meant that if the court wanted to do something for
Loretta, it needed to find a property remedy for her.
123. Telephone interview with Willard H. DaSilva, (Feb. 17, 2006).
124. Id.
125. Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 11, O'Brien v. O'Brien, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548
(N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
126. A well-known early case coming to this conclusion was In re Marriage of
Morrison, 573 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1978).
127. The majority wrote:
[I]mplicit in the statutory scheme.., is the view that upon dissolution of the
marriage there should be a winding up of the parties' economic affairs and a
severance of their economic ties by an equitable distribution of the marital
assets. Thus, the concept of alimony, which often served as a means of life-
time support and dependence for one spouse upon the other long after the
976 [Vol. 27:949
28https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol27/iss4/14
O'BRIEN V. O'BRIEN
Events outside the courtroom might have motivated the
court to find a remedy. In addition to the parties' briefs, an
amicus brief was filed in the Court of Appeals by Sally Weinreb,
on behalf of the Westchester Women's Bar Association. Al-
though it did not appear to have much substantive impact, it
did reflect a political reality: Loretta's claim, publicized at the
time in the local media, had begun to take on the attributes of a
cause celebre for individuals and groups who believed women
were not treated fairly in the divorce process. Loretta had pub-
lished a column in the Ladies' Home Journal following her trial
court victory. Entitled It's Not Easy to Be a Woman Today, it
featured a headline blurb quoting Loretta: "I am not the first
wife who sacrificed to put her husband through school only to
lose him to another woman. But in my case, a judge decided
that I deserved a share in my husband's future."128 Local news
media covered the case as it made its way from the trial court
up to the Court of Appeals, and the coverage did not always por-
tray Michael favorably. People made comments to him in the
bank, at the grocery store, telling him he had abused his wife. 129
One Sunday his second wife, Patti, returned from Mass to re-
port that the priest's sermon, about people's obligations to one
another, had used the newspaper account of Michael's divorce
for an example of a husband who sought to avoid his family obli-
gations. 130 Michael stormed over to the church to challenge the
surprised priest, who had no idea this famous abusing husband
was in his congregation. 13'
It would not be surprising if the charged public attention
the O'Brien case received affected the court's deliberations.
Loretta became for many a symbol of the loyal, supportive wife
who was exploited and then cast aside in the modern era of high
divorce rates. DaSilva later recalled that Judith Kaye led the
onslaught at oral argument for the trial court's position. At one
marriage was over, was replaced with the concept of maintenance which
seeks to allow the recipient spouse an opportunity to achieve economic
independence.
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 716 (N.Y. 1985) (citations omitted).
128. Loretta O'Brien, It's Not Easy to Be a Woman Today, LADIEs' HOME JOUR-
NAL, Nov. 1982 at 40.
129. Interview, supra note 16.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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point Kaye and Meyers argued with one another while the law-
yers watched. When DaSilva left the courtroom, he felt that it
would be a 4-3 decision, but he was not sure which way it would
go. In fact, the court ruled unanimously for Loretta, although
Meyers wrote a concurrence that focused on reasons why the
ruling was likely to be problematic. DaSilva later had a chance
to ask Meyers why he hadn't labeled his opinion a dissent.
Meyers told him "you have to understand the politics."1 32 He
also said it seemed important to present the case as unanimous
even if it really was not. Meyers told DaSilva that Kaye had
argued strongly for her position within the court, that she was
very persuasive, but that also "arms were twisted."
Kaye, however, did not write the court's opinion. Wachtler
assigned it instead to Richard Simons. One might not have
thought this assignment augured well for Loretta. As an appel-
late division judge in 1978, Simons had written the last impor-
tant decision under New York's old marital property law. Saff
v. Saff, was decided in 1978, only two years before the legisla-
tive reform. 133 The question in Saff was whether New York's
courts could use the constructive trust doctrine in applying the
common law title system, as many other common law courts
had done. 34 The facts were certainly appealing. The Saffs had
married in 1936 when they both were poor. 135 Over the next ten
years Mrs. Saff held a series of jobs as a maid and factory
worker to help keep them afloat. 3 6 All their funds were held in
a joint account, and in 1946 Mr. Saff used them to start a steel
company with a partner. 137 While the men concentrated on sell-
ing, Mrs. Saff ran the company office, doing everything from
dealing with creditors to painting steel beams too big to fit in
their garage. 38 She also handled the Saffs personal finances
and was the primary caretaker of their two adopted children,
one of whom contracted polio and required constant care.139
132. Telephone interview with Willard H. DaSilva, (Feb. 17, 2006).
133. Saff v. Saff, 402 N.Y.S.2d 690 (App. Div. 1978), appeal dismissed, 389
N.E.2d 142 (N.Y. 1979).
134. Id. at 691-92.
135. Id. at 692.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 693.
139. Id. at 697 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
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The steel company proved successful, and Mrs. Saff remained
the company bookkeeper even when the Saffs separated after
nearly 40 years of marriage. 140 She sought a share of the com-
pany assets, but they were largely held in Mr. Saff's name.' 4 1
She claimed that their history together implied his promise to
share them.142 Writing for the majority in a split decision of the
Appellate Division, Judge Simons affirmed the trial court deci-
sion denying her claim:
[Piromises going to the marriage relationship and those going to a
business relationship .... may not be mixed together in some sort
of salmagundi . .. to find an implied promise that the wife will
share in the ownership of a specific business because of such unre-
lated acts as her employment as a maid or drill press operator,
her care of the children or her handling of the family finances.
The remedy of constructive trust may not be applied randomly to
adjust general equities between spouses .... [%] Appellant's par-
ticipation in the business is easily explainable as a normal inci-
dent of marriage.., without any expectation on her part of any
future ownership of the business. [ 1 ... This case is a vivid illus-
tration of the dangers of creating a judicial version of a commu-
nity property law. 143
Mrs. Staffs appeal from his decision was dismissed by the
Court of Appeals in 1979.'4 In 1983 Simons was elevated to the
Court of Appeals, and in 1985 wrote the court's opinion in
O'Brien.145
His statement of the O'Brien facts accepted the trial court's
factual findings: Loretta had relinquished her opportunity to
obtain her permanent teacher's certificate to allow Michael to
pursue his education; had supported the parties while Michael
"pursued his studies," and had provided 76 percent of the par-
ties' income during the marriage, "exclusive of a $10,000 loan
obtained" by Michael. 146 He told the reader that Michael had
commenced the divorce action as soon as he received his medi-
cal license, obliquely suggesting the same image of exploitation
140. Id. at 694.
141. Id. at 693.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 693-94.
144. Saff v. Saff, 389 N.E.2d 142 (N.Y. 1979).
145. See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985).
146. Id. at 714.
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that Emanuelli had urged with his diagnosis of "medical license
syndrome."1 47 He dismissed Michael's citation of "similar cases
from other jurisdictions" because "the New York Legislature de-
liberately went beyond traditional property concepts when it
formulated the Equitable Distribution Law."148 He italicized for
emphasis the words of the New York statute that made clear its
courts could distribute marital property between the spouses
"regardless of the form in which title is held"-perhaps a shock
for the author of Saff, but the longstanding rule in most of the
rest of the country."49 Citing the New York-centric analysis of
Foster and Freed, and excited comments from a local bar jour-
nal that found the new statute revolutionary, the opinion
bought-or sold itself-Emanuelli's "New York uniqueness" argu-
ment hook, line, and sinker. 5 0
New York judges do seem to assume that little can be
learned from the law of other states, and Simons' wonderment
at the changes that equitable distribution reforms had made, in
the old property law he knew so well, seemed only to exacerbate
this tendency. For Simons, and the New Yorkers whose writ-
ings he quoted, a statute that made title no longer determina-
tive could not really be a property system at all.'51 By enacting
such radical and unprecedented rules the legislature must have
meant to replace property law, not merely to reform it. And if
justice for wives was this reform's impetus, then equity, as seen
through judicial eyes, must be the replacement they intended.
Simons had traveled entirely across the doctrinal world, moving
from Saffs endorsement of strict and mechanical property
rules, with no room for judicial discretion, to O'Brien's endorse-
ment of unrestrained discretion, with no rules at all. The new
marital property statutes, in New York as elsewhere, did not
create the "salmagundi" Simons feared in Saff.152 No other
147. Id.
148. Id. at 715.
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. Id.
152. Saff v. Saff, 402 N.Y.S.2d 690, 693 (App. Div. 1978), appeal dismissed,
389 N.E.2d 142 (N.Y. 1979). " Salmagundi" is defined in dictinary.com as a "salad
of chopped meat, anchovies, eggs, and onions, often arranged in rows on lettuce
and served with vinegar and oil" or, more generally, "a mixture or assortment; a
potpourri."
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state had concluded that one had to abandon all normal prop-
erty law principles to recognize the wife's interest in property
acquired during marriage through her husband's labors.
F. The Aftermath of O'Brien.
As DaSilva warned in his brief, O'Brien wreaked havoc
with the New York law. 153 Struggling with the precedent, New
York's lower courts realized early on that there was no basis for
distinguishing a husband's medical license from advances in a
wife's acting career or a husband's successful completion of civil
service examinations for police lieutenant.1M Yet if every ad-
vance during marriage in a spouse's earning capacity consti-
tutes marital property, then great injustices will often result if
marital property is simply divided equally at divorce. So
O'Brien has made it impossible for New York to follow the na-
tional trend toward divorce law that presumes marital property
be divided equally. The division of marital property in New
York must instead involve time-consuming and expensive in-
quiries into the conduct of the parties' marriage. New York
courts have held, for example, that a wife had no claim to the
enhanced earning capacity resulting from her husband having
passed his actuary examinations because the husband had per-
formed most household duties and the wife did not contribute to
his success. 55
DaSilva recently described the legal climate created by
O'Brien as "a nightmare."156 The rule of O'Brien often seems to
require nonsensical results, such as giving a high-earning hus-
band a share in the added earning capacity enjoyed from the
teaching certificate acquired during marriage by his lower-
earning wife. Avoiding such absurdities requires New York
courts to manufacture reasons why such a spouse should re-
ceive a very low percentage of the degree's or certificate's value.
153. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, O'Brien v. O'Brien, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548 (App.
Div. 1985).
154. Golub v. Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (acting); see also Elkus
v. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901 (App. Div. 1991) (husband's claim to wife's successful
career as an opera singer); Allocco v. Allocco, 578 N.Y.S.2d 995 (Sup. Ct. 1991)
(civil service examinations).
155. McAlpine v. McAlpine, 574 N.Y.S.2d 385 (App. Div. 1991).
156. Telephone interview with Willard H. DaSilva, (Feb. 17, 2006).
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In one case the court explained that even though the husband
provided all the wife's financial support during her education,
and gave her personal assistance with her studies, the certifi-
cate was primarily the result of her own abilities and efforts; 15 7
a point that of course could just as well be made in O'Brien, and
sometimes has been made in similar cases decided since. 15 8 The
consequence is that marital property awards in New York are
entirely unpredictable.
O'Brien made it impossible for New York to follow the na-
tional trend toward divorce rules that presumes marital prop-
erty be divided equally. The division of marital property in New
York instead involves time-consuming and expensive inquiries
into the conduct of the parties' marriage. These concerns
loomed large in the rejection of O'Brien by the American Law
Institute in its comprehensive analysis of family dissolution
law, released in 2000. As the A.L.I. explained, the real policy
question is how to identify the cases in which a person should
have a claim on the income their former spouse earns after their
marriage has ended. The A.L.I. concluded that marital dura-
tion provided a better indicator of the equity of such claims than
the happenstance that a degree or other credential was earned
during the relationship, which might have been long or short.
It therefore chose to provide for such duration-based claims in a
revitalized and regularized system of alimony (recast as "com-
pensatory payments), rather than through the property
system. 159
157. E.g., Brough v. Brough, 727 N.Y.S.2d 555 (App. Div. 2001) (offering this
explanation in granting the husband only 10 percent of the wife's enhanced earn-
ings arising from the B.A., M.A., and teacher's certificate she earned during their
20-year marriage); Gandhi v. Gandhi, 724 N.Y.S.2d 541 (App. Div. 2001) (stating
that neither the husband's accounting degree, earned partially before marriage,
nor the wife's paralegal degree, earned partially after the marriage, should be allo-
cated because the husband's CPA license was attributable in part to his intelli-
gence and hard work).
158. Conasanti v. Conasanti, 744 N.Y.S.2d 614 (App. Div. 2002). Conasanti
granted the wife only 30 percent of the husband's medical degree, because "al-
though [the wife's] efforts certainly contributed to the ability of [the husband] to
obtain his medical license and advanced degrees, those achievements were accom-
plished primarily through [his] own ability and herculean effort as well as his own
capacity for hard work." Id. (citations omitted).
159. American Law Institute, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION
§ 4.07, Comment a (2000).
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Although O'Brien has been rejected by every other state
high court to consider the matter, the New York Court of Ap-
peals has held firm, even overruling lower court decisions at-
tempting to ameliorate O'Brien's consequences. 6 0 In 1995 the
New York State Bar Association unsuccessfully urged the legis-
lature to overrule O'Brien.161 Judith Kaye, the only member of
the O'Brien majority remaining on the Court of Appeals, and
now its Chief Judge, appointed a commission in 2004 "to ex-
amine every facet of the divorce and custody . . . process and
recommend reforms to reduce trauma, delay and cost to parents
and children .... ,,162 Although the Commission's charge was to
focus on procedural reforms, the majority could not restrain it-
self from making a single substantive recommendation in its
2006 report: overrule O'Brien.163
The Court of Appeals decision probably had less impact on
Michael and Loretta than it had on New York law. The Court
issued its opinion the day after Christmas in 1985, almost ex-
actly five years to the day after Michael's original summons had
been served. Michael, still then a medical resident, learned of
160. The court reaffirmed and actually expanded O'Brien in McSparron v. Mc-
Sparron, 662 N.E.2d 745 (N.Y. 1995). Lower New York courts had declined to ap-
ply O'Brien to a degree held by a spouse who had subsequently established a
successful professional practice that was also subject to division, finding that in
such cases the degree or license had "merged" into the practice and need not be
divided separately from it. Many expected that McSparron, in reviewing these
cases, would overrule O'Brien, but instead it disapproved the lower court decisions
and suggested that ensuring the separate treatment of the license as marital prop-
erty is necessary in order to avoid introducing "nettlesome legal fictions" in the
law. McSparron's discussion of O'Brien does not acknowledge its unanimous rejec-
tion by other state high courts. In Grunfeld v Grunfeld, 731 N.E.2d 142 (N.Y.
2000), the court did instruct lower courts to avoid the double-counting that would
result from basing a property award of a share in a degree, and a maintenance
award, on the same post-divorce income, but it reaffirmed O'Brien, again to the
surprise of many.
161. N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON FAMILY LAW 15 (Aug.
19, 1996); Spencer, No-Fault Divorce Endorsed By State Bar, Uphill Battle Pre-
dicted for State Legislature, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 27, 1997, at 1.
162. MATRIMONIAL COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK (2006), http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reports/matrimonialcommission
report.pdf; reprinted here as Appendix A.
163. "Consistent with the Commission's mandate to reduce the cost and
length of matrimonial proceedings and to increase the public's confidence in the
fairness and rationality of the awards rendered by the courts, the Commission rec-
ommends that legislation be adopted that eliminates a party's 'enhanced earning
capacity' as a marital asset." Id. at 66.
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the decision on his way to work.'6 He felt devastated, but his
family, parents and four siblings were very supportive. 165 Work
was a distraction and he turned down his senior's offer to give
him some time off.166 Not surprisingly, the other doctors were
also supportive. It was nonetheless often difficult because the
publicity meant that everyone knew who he was. In the end,
however, Michael never had to pay Loretta the $188,000 that
Daronco had ordered. Still in training, Michael's income was
not high, and he had credit card debts as well as education
loans to repay. The judgment far exceeded his assets.
Emanuelli initially turned down DaSilva's renewed settlement
offer, for a lesser amount more plausibly within Michael's finan-
cial capacity. He thought DaSilva crazy to repeat, after his
Court of Appeals loss, an offer Emanuelli had rejected three
times before. But DaSilva explained that if the judgment stood,
Michael would have no choice but to declare bankruptcy, which
could wipe the judgment out. 67 Loretta then accepted the set-
tlement offer, but on the condition that its terms never be made
public.
Michael was comfortable with the settlement; he recalled
years later that he had felt Loretta deserved something, and
was even prepared to take out a loan to give her "a chunk of
money," but not the amount she claimed. 16 While the pay-
ments called for in the original judgment were more than he
earned, the settlement "was a little better," and he complied
fully with its terms even though the financial burden was "con-
siderable," especially at the beginning when he worked addi-
tional hours as a resident to pay it, taking time away from his
new family. 169 He began payments in 1986, and paid it off a
year early in 1999, "just to get rid of it."170
164. Interview, supra note 16.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. It is not clear whether Michael could avoid the judgment under cur-
rent bankruptcy law.
168. Id.
169. The original decree did provide for annual payments that were lower at
first to take account of the lower income he was initially expected to make, al-
though the required amount reached $10,000 in 1986, the year after the Court of
Appeals decision in O'Brien, escalating to $35,000 by 1989. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 452
N.Y.S.2d 801, 806 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
170. Interview, supra note 16.
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Just as he suggested at trial, Michael never became a sur-
geon. He chose instead a residency in emergency medicine. He
recently recalled that emergency medicine was then a new field,
and residencies were hard to get in to.171 He had an extra hur-
dle because he was foreign trained. He had to prove himself,
and he did. In 2006 Michael was still working as an emergency
room physician, in upstate New York. Even today, people at the
hospital sometimes ask him if he is the Dr. O'Brien.
Michael also sought an annulment of his marriage in the
Church tribunals, a step that was important to him as a Catho-
lic. Michael recalled that Loretta resented the annulment.172 A
priest told him Loretta thought the marriage should have lasted
and that she had paid Michael's way. 173 He told the priest that
he had his facts wrong and stormed out, but learned a few
weeks later that the annulment was granted on grounds of im-
maturity at the time the marriage had been entered into. 174
Patty also obtained an annulment of her first marriage, and
Michael and Patty were married in a church wedding on Saint
Patrick's Day in 1985, before Michael's case was argued in the
Court of Appeals. 175 Michael and Patty ultimately had two chil-
dren, and were still together in 2006.
Loretta died in November, 2002, survived by her second
husband, James Lynch, and their child Jaime. The obituary de-
scribed her as a life-long resident of Yonkers, where she appar-
ently lived with her second husband till her death. 176 It seems
that Loretta never did seek the higher pay available by teaching
in public school; her obituary describes her as having "first
taught Kindergarten at St. Peter's School in Yonkers and then
at St. Dominic School in the Bronx.' 77 Friends were urged, in
lieu of flowers, to contribute to the scholarship fund the school
set up in her name. 78
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. The Obituary was published in the local newspaper, the Journal News,
on November 6th, 2002.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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